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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relationship between current tax reforms -
introduction of the Sales Tax, and abolition of G.P.T. and some consumption 
taxes - and reform of the industrial protection system. The arguments for 
industrial protection are briefly outlined and the need for reforming the 
the Kenyan system is discussed. It is concluded that the tax reform is 
likely to have a beneficial effect on employment and will reduce inequities 
in the tax system. The effect on the protection system will be neutral with 
some exceptions. For protection reform the further step of some sort of 
export subsidy is necessary, with liberalization of the import licensing 
system. 
Current (May 1973) steps in the direction of tax reform appear 
designed to increase the rate of growth of tax revenues and to provide, 
within a larger framework of reform measures, more effective incentives 
for industrial growth. The former is a means of raising public saving 
for a more rapid rate of economic growth within acceptable limits of 
dependence on foreign aid and capital import. The latter is a means, 
at least in part, of accomodating to the inability or unwillingness of 
Kenya's East African partner states to agree on reform of tariff and 
trade policies which have important implications for Kenya's industrial 
growth„ 
This paper focuses on the latter of these two objectives - the 
relationship of current tax reform to reform of the industrial protection 
system. The first section is a brief review of the arguments for 
industrial protection. The need for reform of Kenya's protection system is 
argued in the second section. The implications of the current tax reform 
for industrial protection and some speculation about steps for further 
reform are set out in the final section. 
1. WHY INDUSTRIAL PROTECTION?1 
A policy of industrial protection arises from the need for industrial 
growth, together with the existence of obstacles to industrial growth. The 
need for industrial growth arises from the relationship between population 
growth and natural resources. For some time to come, of course, the bulk 
of new employment opportunities must be found in agriculture, but this will 
become increasingly difficult as population grows. At some not too distant 
future time in Kenya, land will be more critically scarce than it is today. 
It is important, long before that point is reached, to create a capacity for 
employment in sectors other than those based on natural resources. This will 
take time. Even with moderately rapid expansion, the industrial sector can-
not become a major employer within the next decade yet, during that time, the 
labour force will grow by forty per cent. 
The Kenya Government, quite rightly, makes rural development agricul-
ture and rural industrialization a principal concern. What is needed is 
not a shift of that emphasis nor a shift of resources to industry. Instead, 
1. For a fuller discussion, see the author's ;iThe Role of Protection in 
Industrialization Policy," Eastern Africa Economic Review, June 1972. 
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what is required is the removal of unnecessary constraints, some institu-
tional and some result of misguided policies. I will return to this point 
shortly. 
Industrialization should begin early, and it is important to begin 
it right. It would be disadvantageous to neglect industrialization until 
land became a critical bottleneck, and then try to launch a massive 
industrialization drive; it would also be disadvantageous to bias policies 
toward import substitution and then, when such opportunities are exhaused, 
suddenly shift to an export bias. It would be equally unwise, within an 
import substitution strategy, to emphasize only the finishing stages of 
consumption goods manufacture before attempting backward integration 
import substitution in intermediate and capital goods. Such biases force 
sub-optimal choices, distort structural patterns and create vested interests; 
subsequent required shifts In policy would be both painful and difficult. 
Rather, policies must be found that encourage the best choices among all of 
the available opportunities without bias toward either early or finishing 
stages In the production process, consumers goods or capital goods, exports 
or import substitutes, etc. A country that makes the best selective use of 
its opportunities in each of these areas, will do better than one that follows 
a particular bias (strategy?) in one direction or another. 
While this principle will hardly be disputed, it begs the question: 
what is a bias?; and to answer that question fully might require a treatise. 
But most of us can agree, I think, that there are identifiable situations in 
which relative prices and costs are distorted without apparent rationale. 
Distortions arise from institutional sources, from misguided government 
policies, or both, circumstances which can reinforce as well as offset each 
other's effects. From whatever source, price and cost distortions prevent 
the economy from achieving its goals efficiently and limit both output and 
growth. The problem of industrial protection is, then, to correct market 
failures due to imperfect institutions with a minimum of additional distortion 
from government policies. 
Other possible goals of industrial protection are balance of payments 
equilibrium or avoidance of a foreign exchange constraint. These require 
Improved incentives for the production of traded goods (import substitutes 
and exports) vis a vis non-traded goods and are most simply and efficiently 
accomplished by an exchange rate adjustment. (A uniform change In all 
tariffs combined with export subsidies would be roughly equivalent). By 
contrast, Increased tariff protection alone (or import bans and licensing) 
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produces a biased effect, like a multiple exchange rate system, and causes 
the economy to use more resources than needed to balance the foreign exchange 
budget„ 
More important, tariffs and import controls confine protection to the 
limited domestic market and thereby constrain growth; in contrast, a rise 
in the price of foreign exchange protects local industries in both domestic 
and foreign markets. The latter would promote industrial exports and import 
substitution industry, opening the way for more rapid industrial growth and 
avoiding the excessive costs of an industrialization based on the narrow 
domestic market. 
The argument that devaluation as compared to import restriction, 
implies a terms of trade cost is not valid. The terms of trade effect is one 
of those market failures that needs to be corrected whatever the exchange 
2 
rate. As I have argued elsewhere, this calls for special treatment for a 
few important exports and, at most, a very modest bias against the rest. Once 
these are taken care of (and it should be done whether the balance of payments 
is in equilibrium or not), devaluation (or equivalent) is the superior remedy 
for a balance of payments deficit. Any further tightening of import restric-
tions would raise the bias against exports above the optimal level. A 
balance of payments policy should be used to avoid a balance of payments 
constraint, not for industrial protection. 
The need for industrial protection arises, rather, from the existence 
of market failures; the most important tasks in framing protection policy are 
to identify them and to evaluate their magnitudes. The latter is a very 
difficult task, requiring a great amount of specific information beyond the 
scope of the discussion here. Nevertheless, it is extremely important from 
the standpoint of rational planning that the government attempt to obtain 
the necessary facts: what is an appropriate shadow price for unskilled 
labour? for capital? for the exchange rate? What is the potential for cost 
reduction from scale expansion or learning-by-doing in different industries? 
I note that it would be far easier to get reasonable answers to these 
questions under a regime of policies which minimise additional price distor-
tion. 
With respect to the identification of market failures, they can be 
classified according to their origin: foreign, domestic-institutional, and 
domestic-policy. The last of these reflects a need for reforming protection 
rather than a need for protection itself. 
2. Power, op.cit., p. 11. 
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It is widely recognized that world markets do not operate ideally to 
facilitate industrialization in less-developed countries. Protection systems 
in virtually all countries are biased against the import of processed and 
finished goods, as opposed to raw and semi-processed. In addition, there 
Is a tendency for reactive protectionism against successful efforts of less-
developed countries to penetrate the rich countries' markets for manufactured 
goods. These are serious disadvantages; but so far they have not been 
decisive for those countries that have avoided their own biases against 
industrial exports. Recent history suggests that any less-developed country 
(if small) could expect a high degree of success from "unleashing" its own 
export potential. This may be true, of course, only because so few have 
tried it. But this is an element In the situation that is likely to persist. 
Kenya's small size and good start in this direction (despite strong domestic 
policy and institutional biases against it) portend success. 
But even with the best prospects in the world a country will only 
succeed in developing a flourishing export trade if its policies favor such 
a development. One reason is that there must always be considerable risks 
in opening up export markets - most of them risks facing the individual firm 
and if governments pursue policies that make exporting more difficult, then 
private firms will be correspondingly more reluctant to incur these risks. 
Since private entrepreneurs tend in general to exaggerate these risks it is 
the more necessary that governments, which can assess the risks more realis-
tically, should not do anything to discourage exporting but rather pursue 
policies which minimize their apprehensions and thus encourage them to take 
the risks. Governments must therefore, if anything, subsidize exports rather 
than penalize them. 
In contrast, a bias toward import substitution tends to Increase 
dependence on a few primary exports, increasing the social risk from exporting 
manufactures because, while all exports are penalized by protection for 
import substitutes, primary exports can often remain competitive because 
of their lower wage and other costs. Moreover, factor prices in primary 
production are usually flexible (even downward) so that incomes earned there 
tend to adjust to the combined offer of the world market and negative protec-
3 
tion. In contrast, Industrial exports are inhibited by relatively higher 
wage rates (Inflexible downward) by negative protection. 
3. For an explanation of negative protection, see Power, op.cit., 
pp. 12-14
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A single small country like Kenya has, of course, little independent 
influence on world obstacles to industrialization. Only through joint action 
with others could appreciable influence be exerted. The one important 
exception to this generalization is the terms of trade effect of increasing 
exports. But, as was indicated above, the solution to this problem is not 
import substitution protection which creates a general bias against all imports. 
What is needed, rather, are specific policies (possibly including international 
commodity agreements) for those few exports whose terms of trade effects are 
important. 
With respect to domestic institutional market failures, the most 
important for Kenya is wage dualism - a market wage in the industrial sector 
far above earnings of labour in agriculture and other non-industrial activities. 
This means that primary products can be exported in substantial volume at an 
exchange rate at which most industrial products cannot compete in world 
markets. It appears if one accepts market prices, that Kenya has a comparative 
advantage in primary products and a comparative disadvantage in industrial 
products. While this is doubtless true in some cases, it is likely to be 
false in others, owing to the general bias against industrial products created 
by the distorted wage structure. Kenya ought to have a comparative advantage 
in a wide variety of labour-intensive manufactures; yet the price system is 
not allowed fully to reveal this. Instead, industrial exports are made to 
appear unprofitable and production for the home market is possible only behind 
protection. It should be added that wage dualism is a case of market failure 
where Kenya's policies have exaggerated rather than diminished the bias. 
The infant industry situation is another well-known example of market 
failure. Economies of scale and a learning process combine to suggest that 
long-run comparative advantage may be masked by temporary high costs during 
the early stages of development of an industry. It can be argued, of course, 
that private investors can see this circumstance as well as the government. 
The case for government assistance in such cases turns on a denial of this 
argument, on the government's placing a relatively higher value on long-run 
advantages, or on recognition of imperfections in capital markets for private 
investment, In any case, market failure is not confined to industry; it 
applies equally to some new agricultural industries and to some new technolo-
gies in old agricultural industries. Nevertheless, it can be considered an 
important reason for temporary assistance to selected manufacturing industries. 
As we shall see below, however, the traditional remedy of tariff protection 
or import restriction is not appropriate. 
Finally there is interdependence of investment decisions which, 
especially when combined with economies of scale, can often cause social 
profitability of investments to diverge from their apparent private profit-
14 
ability. Under these circumstances there is an important role for govern-
ment influence on private investment decisions. Again, however, the remedy 
of protecting the home market is inappropriate, because it inhibits the 
exploitation of scale economies and discourages potentially profitable 
inter-industry linkages. 
In sum, there are market failures, of foreign or domestic institutional 
origin, that would bias Investment away from the industrial sector - in the 
absence of policy measures to counteract them. It is suggested, however, that 
the traditional form of industrial protection - tariffs and import restric-
tion - are in most cases not the appropriate remedy. 
2. THE NEED FOR REFORM. 
The need for reform of Kenya's protection system has been the subject 
of a number of recent papers and seminars at the Institute for Development 
Studies; the topic is emphasized also in the report of the ILO Employment 
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Mission to Kenya. What follows is a brief recapitulation of the main points 
at issue. 
Industrial protection in Kenya takes the form, principally, of tariffs 
and restrictions on imports through licensing or outright bans. This means 
that Industries are protected in the home market, but not in the world market. 
This is not surprising since "protection" has traditionally been viewed as 
protection of the home market. The modern concept of protection is broader, 
however, including all of those measures that give home industries an advantage, 
in any and all markets, over their foreign rivals. Japan, Germany and other 
4. See H. Chenery, "The Interdependence of Investment Decisions," in 
M. Abramovitz, et. al., The Allocation of Economic Resources, Stanford University 
Press, 1961. 
5. M.G. Phelps and B. Wasow, "Measuring Protection and its Effects," IDS 
Discussion Paper No. 147 (forthcoming); P.N. Hopcraft, "Toward a Protectionist 
Economy?," IDS Working Paper No. 29, March 1972; S.R. Lewis, "The Effects of 
Protection on the Growth Rate of the Economy and on the Need for External 
Assistance," IDS Discussion Paper No. 140, April 1972; R.C. Porter, "Toward 
an Export Policy for Kenya," Working Paper No. 105, May 1973; J.H. Power, o 
Op.Cit.; International Labour Office, Employment, Incomes and Equality: A 
Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya, 1972, especially chapters 
11 and 17. 
6. Little, Scitovsky and Scott have preferred to call assistance given to 
export industries "promotion" rather than protection, See their Industry and Trade 
in Some Developing Countries, Oxford University Press, 1970. 
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European countries have demonstrated in recent years that it is possible, 
through appropriate subsidies and exchange rate policies, effectively to 
give home industries protection in world markets as well as in home markets 
something the United States and most newly developing countries have yet 
to learn. 
The failure to provide balanced protection to Kenyan industries in 
the world market is especially harmful to manufactured exports. As was pointed 
out above, the less favourable exchange rate which protection defends is more 
effective in inhibiting exports from the high - rigid-wage industrial sector 
than from the low - flexible-wage primary sector; the net effect is to 
heighten Kenya's dependence on primary exports. 
In addition to a general bias against exports, there is a further 
bias due to the wide range of effective rates of protection for import substi-
7 tutes. Rates vary from close to zero to almost 2,000 per cent, with more 
Q 
than one-third above 100 per cent. In general the bias favours consumers 
goods and penalizes producers goods. For some potential capital and interme-
diate goods industries, effective rates of protection would be negative; the 
system inhibits backward integration. Producers of consumers goods are mostly 
well protected but, because of the zero or low duties on equipment and supplies 
from abroad, there is little incentive to establish the more basic stages of 
manufacturing. The sector remains heavily dependent on imports whose foreign 
exchange requirement must be earned by the primary sectors. 
In addition to the bias against producers goods, widely varying rates 
of protection among import substitutes suggest (1) that the economy is paying 
for more to save foreign exchange in some industries than it costs to save or 
earn foreign exchange in others, or (2) that excessive profits (and perhaps 
wages) are being earned behind protection. In either case the foreign 
exchange budget is balanced at an excessive cost to the rest of the economy. 
Low duties on imported materials and equipment combined with high 
duties on finished goods naturally favour those industries that import their 
supplies and sell their finished products in the domestic market. This works 
7. Phelps and Wasow, Op. Cit. 
8. This is based on the usual measure of effective protection, namely, 
the proportion by which value added in domestic prices is above value added 
in world prices. Phelps and Wasow use instead the proportion of value added 
in domestic prices that is attributable to protection. 
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to discourage processing of Kenya's own materials, especially when the product 
9 . . . might be exported. Yet, according to the ILO Report, it is just these 
industries that hold the most promise for rapid industrial expansion and growth 
of manufactured exports. 
Related to the bias against the processing of domestic materials and 
the failure of manufacturing to link backward to agriculture and other 
primary sectors Is the concentration of manufacturing in one or two urban 
centers. Reform of the protection system should contribute to greater regional 
balance in the development process. 
Finally there is an employment bias in the existing protection system. 
This has many aspects, only two of which will be singled out here."'""'" First 
the artificial cheapening of capital and other imported inputs encourage their 
substitution for labour. An overvalued currency (undervaluation of foreign 
exchange) defended by protectionist policies, combined with zero or minimal 
duties on (or liberal licensing of) capital and raw material imports, permits 
prices for these goods levels that would obtain under a free trade equilibrium; 
their use is heavily subsidised. This together with other subsidies on the 
use of capital, helps to explain the excessive capital intensity and poor employ-
ment performance of Kenyan Industry. 
Excessive capital Intensity is encouraged also by the high wage rates 
12 
m the industrial sector. Protection of the home market tends to underwrite 
and intensify wage dualism, if it is not indeed the cause of it. Labour, 
through the intervention of trade unions and government, Is able to capture 
a share of the protection offered and, thereby, to dilute it to some extent. 
Protection then may have to be raised further and a wage-protection spiral 
is under way. This further weakens the export prospects of the manufacturing 
sector and enhances the labour-saving bias of choices among industries and 13 technologies. There are other disadvantages of the present protection system, 
9. See J.H. Power, "A Note on Protection and the Processing of Primary 
Commodities," IDS Working Paper No. 60, August 1972. 
10. Op. Cit. , p. 186. 
11. For a fuller discussion, see J.H. Power, "Protection and Employment: 
a Macroeconomic Approach," IDS Discussion Paper No. 151, November 1972. 
12. High relative to earnings in agriculture. 
13. See, for example, the section entitled, "Import Substitution and its 
Main Defects," in Chapter 11 of the ILO Report, Op, Cit. , pp. 180-182. 
- 9 
but enough has been said to indicate the main lines of the needed reform. 
First, the bias against industrial exports (and many non-industrial exports) 
needs correction. Second, there should be a move toward more uniform rates 
of tariff protection - the high coming down and the low moving up. Third, 
import licensing, which in recent months has accentuated most of the bad 
features of the protection system while introducing some new problems of its 
. . 14 own, should be liberalised and its administration streamlined. Fourth, 
indirect domestic taxes (sales or excise) should be substituted for tariffs 
and licensing of imports for control of non-essential consumption.1^ Fifth, 
government tax revenue must be increased to permit substitution of subsidies 
(including tax remissions and refunds) for tariffs and licensing as in.- 'ruments 
16 
of protection. This will permit tariffs to play their legitimate roxe 
that of raising revenue. 
An ideal system for correcting the institutional biases against 
industrialization in Kenya would simultaneously minimize distortions and 
17 
effectively raise the revenue needed to finance it. But the problem of 
reform is not to achieve perfection at once; that would be impossible and 
to attempt it would disrupt the economy unduly. Reform must be gradual. 
Equally important, it must not be delayed. Each step should be consistent 
with the new industrialization strategy that Kenya needs at this stage of its 18 economic development. The guidelines for this new strategy were well stated 
19 
m the ILO Report. There it was proposed that: 
"...future industrialization be turned away to some degree - and 
strongly so in the case of foreign investment - from protected 
firms producing import substitutes toward industries that 
(a) use domestic raw materials; given the existing resource base, 
this means considerable emphasis on industries processing 
agricultural products; 
(b) have potential for developing a comparative advantage in export 
markets; 
14. See D.S. MacRae, "Import Licensing in Kenya," IDS Working Paper No. 90, 
March 1973. 
15. The disadvantage of tariffs and licensing is that they encourage domestic 
production of the very goods whose consumption it is desirable to curtail. 
16. The principal advantage of subsidies is that they can be unbiased with 
respect to exports and import substitutes. 
17. J.H. Power, Op. Cit., pp. 12-18. 
18. The reason that a particular "strategy" is needed now is, in part, to 
compensate for the biases of a previous strategy. 
19. Op. Cit. , p. 185. 
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(c) are more labour-intensive than most of those promoted by-
import substitution; 
(d) would contribut significantly to employment through a 
backward linkage effect; and 
(e) can be economically located in smaller towns and rural areas. 
3. TAX REFORM AND THE STEPS AHEAD 
The current tax reform involves a substitution of a general ten per 
cent sales tax for the Graduated Personal Tax and for certain consumption 
taxes. Exempt from the sales tax are some basic necessities, sales fc. 
intermediate use and exports. Except for its administration, it is very 
much like a value-added tax. Capital goods are considered to be final, not 
Intermediate goods. The tax is on the tariff-inclusive price of imported final 
goods; imports for intermediate use are exempt. 
The substitution of a more general and uniform sales tax for particular 
consumption taxes is a step in the right direction. The elimination of the 
GPT removes a regressive levy, an administrative headache and, possibly in 
some cases, a tax on employment - though the precise incidence of the GPT 
is not certain. This change could have a favourable influence on the use 
of labor though its quantitative importance is probably modest. There Is as 
yet no indication of how the government will replace the GPT as a source of 
finance for local government. But these are matters not directly related to 
the reform of the protection system. 
As for its effect on the protection system, where the tariff rather 
than licensing is the effective protection instrument, and assuming protection 
is not redundant so that domestic price goes up by the amount of the new tax 
on imports, the introduction of the sales tax Is neutral in its protective 
effect. The rise in price of imports is exactly offset by the additional tax 
on the domestic product; there would be no change in domestic value added per 
unit of output. 
This conclusion that the effect of the tax reform on import substitutes 
is neutral, must be modified where there is excess or redundant protection. 
With respect to some imports, tariffs are dominated by bans or licensing so 
that the domestic price is above the tariff-inclusive foreign price. In 
this case, the domestic price should not rise by the amount of the new sales 
tax; the effect will be a reduction in excess protection and in the windfall 
gains of privileged importers. This latter conclusion would have to be 
further modified to allow for the effects of price controls where these are 
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decisive. In cases (if there are any) where tariff protection is redundant 
and it is domestic competition that determines price, excess protection will 
be reduced. Though the sales tax will have to be paid, there will be no 
rise in price. 
Exports are not favoured by their exemption from the tax; the 
exemption merely prevents exports from being penalized vis a_ vis import 
substitutes. However, if the tax must first be paid by exporters and a refund 
requested, there will still be some penalty on exports. 
The neutral effect on value added per unit of exports is not the whole 
story. Since imports and import substitutes will be more expensive, domestic 
consumption will be discouraged, freeing some productive capacity for export. 
This is only a short-run phenomenon, however, and the effect of the tax reform 
on exports from the demand side may be less favorable in the long run; 
exemption of basic foods and other necessities should lead to greater con-
sumption of these items and could harm export prospects for meat, dairy 
products, maize, etc. 
Capital goods are not treated as intermediate goods and are not 
exempt from the tax. Since most capital goods are imported, the effect 
in the short run is tantamount to imposition of a ten per cent duty on capital 
goods. This Is a step in the right direction because it helps to correct the 
artificial under-pricing of capital created by the protection system. It 
should also help to correct the bias against employment. But since the tax 
is also on domestically produced capital goods, the long-run effect is to 
maintain the bias against the development of a domestic capital goods industry. 
To make the tax more nearly like a duty on imported capital goods domestically 
produced equipment should be exempted from the tax. 
As a fiscal reform, as a device to reduce inequities in the tax 
system and to create a structure within which government tax revenue will rise 
as the economy grows, the new tax is all to the good. But for the purposes 
under consideration here, our main conclusion remains that the tax reform does 
very little to influence the protection system and, by itself, is not an 
important reform of the protection system. But it is a pre-requesite to the 
next steps. 
To complement the tax reform and to move in the direction of protection 
reform, the most obvious next step is an export subsidy. Two interesting 
proposals have been offered by Richard Porter at the Institute for Development 
12 -
Studies. One is a system of marketable tax vouchers, awarded per unit of 
foreign exchange earned in exporting. The other is a generalized, uniform 
drawback system. The latter would substitute a flat rate of drawback appli-
cable to all exports in place of the present variable drawback that must be 
negotiated within a bureaucratic morass of red-tape and delay. One of Porter's 
proposals, or something similar, is desperately needed as the next crucial 
step in reform. 
Next there should be a liberalization and simplification of the 
Import licensing system and elimination of import bans. If necessary to 
curb non-essential consumption in specific cases, luxury consumption taxes 
should be imposed. 
It is clear that the steps already taken are, in a way, a substitute 
for the failure of the East African Community to act on long overdue questions 
of tax and tariff reform. While Kenya should continue its effort to persuade 
the Partner States to revitalize Community trade and protection policies to 
promote industrialization and growth in all three countries, it should not be 
deterred from pursuing reforms along the lines outlined above. 
20. Porter, op. cit. 
